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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the impact of the introduction of the UK minimum wage on the 
working hours of low-wage employees using difference-in-differences estimators.  
The estimates using the employer-based New Earnings Surveys indicate that the 
introduction of the minimum wage reduced the basic hours of low-wage workers by 
between 1 and 2 hours per week.  The effects on total paid hours are similar 
(indicating negligible effects on paid overtime) and lagged effects dominate the 
smaller and less significant initial effects within this.  Estimates using the 
employee-based Labour Force Surveys are typically less significant. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The effects of minimum wages have long been debated and are the subject of fierce 
disagreement.  Most heavily investigated has been the impact on employment, testing 
the hypothesis that a minimum wage reduces the demand for low-wage workers.  
Labour demand adjustments may also take place at the hours margin and there is 
rather less evidence on this impact.  Potential hours adjustments are the focus of this 
paper. 
 
In April 1999 the UK, following a change of government, and based on the 
recommendations of a report from the independent Low Pay Commission (LPC, 
1998), introduced a National Minimum Wage.  This followed a period without wage 
floors, following the abolition in 1993 of the Wages Councils that had covered certain 
vulnerable sectors.  The minimum was introduced at an adult rate of £3.60 for all 
employees aged 22 and over and a youth rate of £3.00 for those aged 18 to 21.  
Compliance has been high.  The available evidence suggests an almost complete 
truncation of the wage distribution at £3.60 for adult workers after April 1999 (LPC, 
2001, Stewart and Swaffield, 2002, Dickens and Manning, 2004b) and little in the 
way of wage spillovers (Dickens and Manning, 2004a). 
 
Existing empirical work on the impact of the introduction of the minimum wage 
suggests that while it may have had an adverse effect on employment in particular 
sectors (Machin et al, 2003, for care home workers), the overall effect on employment 
has been broadly neutral (Stewart 2002, 2004a, 2004b).  However potential labour 
demand shifts caused by the minimum wage introduction may also manifest 
themselves as a change in employees’ hours of work.  Firms may reduce employment 
at either or both of the extensive and intensive margins: the number of workers and/or 
the number of hours per worker. A full analysis of any labour demand shift resulting 
from the minimum wage requires an analysis of both these potential responses. 
 
The Low Pay Commission found in the evidence that it received that “a frequently 
reported response to the minimum wage was a unilateral reduction of workers’ hours 
by the employer” (LPC, 2000, page 105).  Similarly the Low Pay Unit observed that 
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“reducing hours appears to be the most common tactic adopted by employers wishing 
to avoid paying the minimum wage” (New Review, Low Pay Unit, 1999). In 
comparison, Connolly and Gregory (2002) using the New Earnings Survey and the 
British Household Panel Survey found no evidence of working hours reduction for 
female workers directly affected by the introduction of the minimum wage. Although 
research in this area is relatively limited, the time-series literature suggests “hours per 
week fall when minimum wages increase, so the effect on hours worked is more 
pronounced that the effect on bodies employed” (Brown, 1999, page 2156). 
 
The potential impact on hours is also important to the wider minimum wage debate.  
Michl (2000) suggests that one possible explanation for the differences between the 
results of Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) on the one hand and Neumark and Wascher 
(2000) on the other in their analyses of the impact of the New Jersey 1992 minimum 
wage increase on the fast-food industry may lie in their different treatment of hours 
worked per employee.  Neumark and Wascher use total payroll hours as their 
dependent variable, and so would capture any hours adjustments.  Card and Krueger 
use the number of workers as their dependent variable and so would not.  Although 
the debate between the two sides focused largely on the quality of the data used, Card 
and Krueger (2000) note in their conclusions, despite their reservations about the data 
used by Neumark and Wascher, that “an alternative interpretation … is that the New 
Jersey minimum-wage increase did not reduce total employment, but it did slightly 
reduce the average number of hours worked per employee” (page 1419). 
 
The point above is reinforced by Couch and Wittenburg (2001), whose analysis of 
state-level monthly data on teenage working hours leads them to argue that the 
elasticity of (teen) labour demand with respect to the minimum wage based on 
employment data understates the minimum wage impact on labour demand relative to 
those based on working hours – by roughly 10-30%. However, Zavodny (2000) who 
investigates the same question for teen workers finds no evidence of either a negative 
association between state-level (teen) average hours of work and the minimum wage 
or, at an individual-level, of a reduction in teenagers’ working hours for those directly 
affected by minimum wage increases. 
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Other US evidence points to the importance of hours in considering the full impact of 
minimum wages on low-wage employees: Linneman (1982), Neumark et al (2004). 
Whether motivated primarily by a focus on labour demand shifts or on overall income 
effects for low-wage employees, there is a clear need to evaluate the impact of the 
minimum wage introduction on the working hours of low-wage employees. 
 
This paper tests whether the April 1999 introduction of the UK minimum wage had a 
significant impact on the working hours of low-wage employees, using individual-
level longitudinal data from two national datasets: the New Earnings Survey (NES) 
and the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The paper uses difference-in-differences 
estimators to estimate a model of an individual employee’s change in paid working 
hours (within the same job) as a function of the individual’s initial position in the 
wage distribution.  Estimators are constructed using different definitions of the group 
directly affected to examine the robustness of the findings.  Alternative “wage gap” 
and spline estimators are also presented. 
 
The next section outlines arguments for why we might expect hours adjustments for 
low-wage workers directly affected by the introduction of the minimum wage. 
Section 3 details the estimation strategy used in the paper. Section 4 provides a brief 
description of the two datasets and the construction of the key variables required for 
the analysis. Section 5 presents results from the difference-in-differences estimation 
and extensions thereof.  It also tests the fundamental identifying assumption 
underlying the difference-in-differences estimator.  Section 6 presents a summary of 
the main findings. 
 
 
2. Theoretical predictions of the effect on working hours 
 
In the standard textbook analysis of the impact of a minimum wage, it is seen as 
raising the wage above its market clearing level, leading to a reduction in the demand 
for labour.  This is usually interpreted as a reduction in employment.  However, the 
adjustment, as well as possibly taking place at the extensive margin, i.e. a reduction in 
the number of workers, can also take place at the intensive margin, i.e. a reduction in 
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the number of (paid) hours per worker.  In the long run a firm’s choice of 
workers-hours mix depends on the extent of fixed costs of employment, the 
technology and productivity-hours schedule, the labour supply schedule faced, the 
presence and effectiveness of a union, etc.  However in the short run, as Hamermesh 
(1993) observes, “employers are quicker to alter hours in response to shocks than they 
are to change levels of employment” (page 294). 
 
Further, if effort per hour worked can also be varied, workers may be made to work 
harder per hour to raise productivity in line with the wage, thereby reducing the 
overall hours required for a particular task. For current purposes, whether this 
increased productivity and reduction in hours arises through higher productivity levels 
during paid hours of work or employers requiring workers to complete designated 
tasks in their own (unpaid) time if not completed during paid hours is less important 
than the prediction of working hours reduction - a prediction in line with the 
competitive model when the market wage rate is raised above the equilibrium level. 
 
However the prediction for hours worked is likely to be more complex than this, even 
in the context of the simple competitive model.  It is a well-established stylized fact 
that full-time employees are paid more than otherwise similar part-time employees, 
which suggests that full-timers produce more per hour.  If this were the case, firms 
would be expected to lengthen workweeks in response to a minimum wage increase 
rather than reduce them (Brown, 1999, page 2117).  This is particularly so if hours are 
fixed within both the full-time and part-time groups. If however one assumes that 
there will be employment-hours substitution within part-time and within full-time, the 
tendency would again be toward fewer working hours. 
 
Thus even within the narrow confines of the textbook labour demand curve model, the 
theoretical prediction of the impact of the introduction of a minimum wage on 
working hours is ambiguous.  This ambiguity is deepened in a dynamic monopsony 
model, where the imposition of a minimum wage can raise total employment input for 
some firms (Dickens et al., 1999, Manning, 2003).  Manning (2003) observes that 
“the impact of minimum wages on employment should primarily be an empirical 
issue”.  The same is true for the impact on hours of work. 
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When considering the likely impact on working hours of the introduction of a 
minimum wage in the UK a number of stylized facts concerning minimum-wage 
workers also seem relevant to consider. These workers tend to be relatively low 
skilled prior to employment and receive relatively limited training whilst in post.  
They also tend to have higher than average turnover rates.  Both these points suggest 
relatively low fixed costs associated with the employment of this type of worker. 
Minimum wage employment also tends to be within the service sector, where the 
intensity of capital usage and potential substitutability of capital for labour is 
relatively low and the incidence of part-time employment is high.  In addition, 
minimum wage workers tend to be from groups (for example based on race or gender) 
that are disadvantaged in the labour market and have low levels of union 
representation.  Finally, UK employment law may make labour demand adjustments 
at the intensive margin, at least in the short to medium term, easier than at the 
extensive margin. 
 
 
3.  Estimation strategy 
 
This paper estimates the effect of the introduction of the minimum wage on the hours 
of work of those employees affected using a difference-in-differences approach.  The 
counterfactual questions to be addressed are: what would have been the change in the 
working hours of employees directly affected by the minimum wage if the minimum 
wage had not been introduced, and are observed changes in hours for this group 
significantly different from this?  Viewing the effect to be estimated in this way 
makes a difference-in-differences estimator a natural method to use.  The central 
feature of the approach is to compare the experience of those individuals affected by 
the introduction of the minimum wage with the experience of a similar group who 
were not directly affected.  The econometric model estimated is a generalised form of 
the models in the literature (for example Lineman (1982), Zavodny (2000), Neumark 
et al (2004)). 
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The construction of the two groups for comparison in the difference-in-differences 
estimator is of course crucial to this approach.  Consider first how to construct the 
group of individuals directly affected by the introduction of the minimum wage 
(known as the “treatment” group in the methodological literature on difference-in-
differences estimation).  One possibility is to construct this group as those whose 
wage was below the level of the minimum prior to its introduction.  This is the group 
used in the analysis of the impact on the probability of remaining in employment 
(Stewart, 2004a).  Defining the group of those directly affected in this way ignores 
incomplete compliance. 
 
When analyzing the impact on hours (unlike when looking at that on the number 
employed), one can also use the information on the wage at time t+1.  The affected 
group is better defined as those individuals earning below the minimum, whose wage 
was actually raised to comply with the new minimum.  Using the information on the 
wage at t+1, the group of those directly affected can be defined as those with a wage 
at t, prior to introduction, below the incoming minimum, and a wage at t+1, after the 
introduction, above the new minimum.  This refinement improves the definition of the 
group affected by using this additional information, but also increases the extent of 
the exogeneity assumption required for the difference-in-differences estimator to be 
consistent. 
 
In this definition the contemporaneous wage, i.e. that at t+1, is now required to be 
exogenous to the hours change from t to t+1.  In a competitive labour market, where 
firms are not able to set wages, this may be tenable (although construction of the wage 
by division by hours may still render it endogenous), but the assumption is not valid if 
firms have some control over the wages they set, as in a dynamic monopsony model 
(Manning, 2003).  In this case one would look for exogenous wage shifts (such as 
those resulting from a minimum wage) to use to “instrument” the endogenous wage.  
Alternatively one can use the (exogenous) wage change required to comply with the 
new minimum directly in place of the actual (partly endogenous) wage change.  This 
of course returns us to the original definition of the “treatment” group above.  The 
exogenity of the wage at t+1 is therefore central to the choice of estimator. 
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The assumption of an exogenous wage requires that if there is a firm-specific shock 
(e.g. to the demand for its product), the firm may adjust hours or employment but is 
not able to adjust the wage.  This strengthening of the required assumptions when the 
contemporaneous wage at t+1 is used suggests that it is worthwhile investigating both 
constructions of the “treatment” group.  Results are therefore presented based on both 
definitions. 
 
Ideally we would wish to compare this affected group with itself in an alternative state 
of the world when the minimum wage had not been introduced, which is of course not 
possible. The approach used here to address the counter-factual questions is to 
construct a second group of employees who act as the control or comparison group. If 
these individuals are similar enough to those affected by the minimum wage 
introduction, the effect of the minimum wage can be estimated by comparing the 
experiences of these two groups before and after the minimum wage introduction.  
The importance of the definition of the control group in this approach is clear.  This 
group needs to be constructed to be similar enough to the sub-minimum-wage group 
directly affected by the minimum wage introduction to generate equivalent 
behavioural responses, but not be themselves affected by the introduction.  A group 
with initial wages just above the minimum is used here. 
 
The validity of the estimator requires a number of assumptions.  Suppose that in the 
absence of a minimum wage the change in hours can be decomposed into two 
components, with the first component fixed over time and the second component 
common across groups. This assumes that in the absence of a minimum wage the 
difference in the average change in the hours of work between groups would be the 
same in each time period, or equivalently that the time paths of hours growth would 
be the same for each group.   This important assumption will be tested in Section 5 
below.  Suppose further that the minimum wage has a constant effect, θ, on the 
change in hours of work for those in group g=1 and no effect on those in group g=2.  
Now consider two time periods, the first, starting at t1, where there was no minimum 
wage in place at either t1 or t1+1, and a second, starting at t2, where the minimum 
wage was introduced between t2 and t2+1.  Differencing across the two groups and 
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across these two time periods (starting t1 and t2) gives θ. Thus the raw difference-in-
differences estimate is given by double differencing these sample means. 
 
Define hit to be the hours of work of individual i at time t.  The focus here is on the 
change in hours, yit = hit+1 - hit.  The difference-in-differences estimator is given by: 
 
2 1 2 1
(1) (1) (2) (2)ˆ ( ) (t t t t )y y y yθ = − − −  (1) 
 
where ( )gty  denotes the average of yit over i in group g. 
 
This difference-in-differences estimator can also be generated by a linear regression 
using micro data pooled across groups and time periods.  If binary indicator variables 
are included for group g=1, time period 2, and the interaction between them, then the 
OLS estimator of the coefficient on the interaction will be the difference-in-
differences estimator, θˆ .  This simple specification is generalized in three ways in the 
model used here.  First it is extended to produce a “regression adjusted” difference-in-
differences estimator by adding a vector of individual characteristics thought to 
influence changes in working hours.  In adding these control variables the aim is to 
deal with any differences between the “affected” or “treatment” group (g = 1) and the 
“comparison” or “control” group (g = 2) not controlled for with the additive group 
and time effect dummies.  Second, as indicated above, an additional group containing 
the rest of the wage distribution above the control group is added (with additional 
indicator variable).  This will improve the estimation of the effects of the individual 
characteristics.  Third multiple pre-minimum time periods are used (with additional 
time dummies). 
 
Define d1i = 1(individual i is in group g=1) = 1(wit < mt+1), where 1(A) is the indicator 
function, equal to 1 if A is true and equal to 0 if not, and define qt = 1(t < t* < t+1), 
indicating the time period for which Δh straddles the introduction of the minimum 
wage at t*.  The other time periods included are prior to t* and no minimum wage is 
in place prior to t*.  Under the assumptions above, the change in working hours of 
individuals in all groups and all time periods can be written as: 
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yit = xit′β + α1d1i + α3d3i + γ0qt + γt + θd1iqt + ϕd3iqt + εit (2) 
 
where d3i = 1(individual i is in group g=3) = 1(wit ≥ mt+1(1+c)), with the control group 
(g=2, i.e. mt+1 ≤ wit < mt+1(1+c)) being the excluded base category, xit is a vector of 
individual characteristics, γt are aggregate time effects, and E[εit⏐xit, g, t] = 0.  In the 
basic specification used in this paper the control group is defined as those employees 
with wages between the minimum wage and 10% above the minimum (i.e. c = 0.1).1  
The sensitivity of the estimates to this choice of upper limit is investigated by also 
considering a wider control group and by a graphical examination.  There is a trade 
off here.  Widening the control group improves cell sizes and hence precision of 
estimation, but may lessen the similarity between the affected and control groups. 
 
This specification uses the first definition of the affected or treatment group discussed 
above.  The second definition of this group described above uses the data on the wage 
at t+1 in addition to that at t.  The affected group now contains those with a wage 
below the incoming minimum at time t and above it at time t+1.  The specification of 
the model needs to be extended slightly in this case.  Since the post-minimum 
treatment and control groups are now restricted to those with wage at t+1 above the 
minimum, there is now an additional group of individuals, containing those with wage 
at t+1 below the minimum, i.e. those not in compliance. 
 
The specification adopted here is to include indicator variables for this group 
partitioned into the three wage ranges previously identified.2  This construction of 
additional groups applies to the period where t+1 is after the introduction of the 
minimum wage.  Prior to the introduction of the minimum the majority of those with a 
real wage at t below £3.60 do not see their real wage at t+1 rise above £3.60.  
However the appropriate inter-temporal comparison is with individuals at a similar 
                                                          
1 In the second definition of the “treatment” group, using the wage information at t+1, it is excluding 
those whose wages at t+1 fell to below the minimum. 
2 One might also consider using a single variable for the group as a whole, a restricted version of the 
specification used, or even combining this group with the group containing those in neither the 
treatment nor the control group (a further restriction).  None of the results presented change more than 
very slightly if these latter two restricted specifications are used and in all cases the restrictions are 
rejected. 
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place in the wage distribution at t.  It is therefore not appropriate to restrict the group 
in this way for the pre-minimum periods. 
 
The specification used defines an indicator variable for those with wage at t+1 above 
the minimum, ait+1 = 1(wit+1 ≥ mt+1), and one for those below, bit+1 = 1-ait+1.  The 
alternative specification is therefore: 
 
yit = xit′β + α1d1i + α3d3i + γ0qtait+1 + γt + θd1iqtait+1 + ϕd3iqtait+1 + δ1d1iqtbit+1  
 + δ2d2iqtbit+1 + δ3d3iqtbit+1 + εit       (3) 
 
with θ again being the parameter of main interest. 
 
There are two key identifying assumptions underlying the modelling processes in 
equations (2) and (3).  The first is that the interaction effects are zero in the absence of 
the minimum wage, after controlling for differences in observable characteristics. The 
issue of concern is that even in the absence of the minimum wage introduction, 
change in working hours may occur differentially in different wage groups. The 
validity of this assumption is tested below.  The second key identifying assumption is 
that the introduction of the minimum wage does not influence the working hours of 
employees in the control group (g = 2).  Changes may occur to the control group due 
to wage spillover or substitution effects between different groups of workers.  
However the evidence for the UK minimum wage introduction suggests that this has 
not been the case. 
 
The difference-in-differences estimators use a binary treatment indicator.  In the case 
of the first treatment group definition above, this is defined as whether the real wage 
at t was below the minimum wage.  This approach restricts the impact of the 
introduction of the minimum to be the same regardless of whether the individual’s 
wage would have needed to have been raised by a relatively small or relatively large 
amount to comply with the introduction of the minimum wage.  An alternative 
estimator can be used which relaxes this assumption and instead takes into account the 
amount by which the individual’s wage at t would have had to be raised.  This 
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alternative approach uses a “wage gap” variable that is the difference between the 
wage at time t and the minimum wage in place at time t+1 (Currie and Fallick, 1996). 
 
This approach is equivalent to replacing d1i in equation (2) with its product with this 
new “wage gap” measure.  Offsetting the advantages of using this specification, a 
problem with the “wage gap” estimator is that it is adversely affected by any unduly 
low values of the wage variable.  As a result, it is more vulnerable to measurement 
error in the wage than the “binary indicator” estimator.  There is something of a 
discrepancy between the representations above and below the minimum in these 
“wage gap” specifications: the equivalent of a spline term is used below the 
minimum, but binary indicator variables are used above the minimum.  One can go 
one step further by modelling the range of the wage distribution above the minimum 
with linear spline terms as well as that below.  Estimators of this type are also 
presented below. 
 
 
4.  Data 
 
The two data sets used in this paper are the New Earnings Survey (NES) and the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Data from the annual NES are utilised from April 1994 
(after the abolition of the Wages Councils) up to April 2000. Data from the quarterly 
LFS are used from the first quarter of 1997 to the third quarter of 2000. The LFS can 
only be used from 1997 quarter 1 onwards, when earnings questions were added to the 
wave 1 questionnaire.  Prior to this, earnings questions were only asked of the 
outgoing, wave 5, respondents. The LFS provides 15 quarterly waves of data, and 
therefore 11 matched (t to t+1) time periods a year apart. The NES provides 7 annual 
waves of data, and therefore 6 matched (t to t+1) time periods.  The paper uses data 
for adult employees, defined as being aged between 22 and 59 (inclusive) for women 
and between 22 and 64 (inclusive) for men at time t, who were with the same 
employer (and in the same job) at times t and t+1. 
 
The advantages of the NES over the LFS are first, the likelihood of greater accuracy 
in reported hours and wage rates due to employers reporting this information (most 
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often) directly from their computerized payroll records, and second, the very large 
sample size, providing much larger cell sizes for the different effects to be analysed 
than the LFS.  The NES also has a potentially important drawback, with most 
employees who earn below the PAYE deduction threshold excluded from the NES. 
This particularly affects part-time workers.  An employee earning below the minimum 
at time t, who has their wage increased at time t+1 to comply with the minimum 
wage, could potentially fall out of the sample if working hours were reduced to the 
extent that weekly earnings were then less than the PAYE deduction threshold.  The 
LFS has a different problem, with some responses provided by proxy rather than by 
the employee in question. This increases the possibility of measurement error.  
Although always an issue with measures of wages and hours, this is potentially 
greater when the wage and hour questions are not answered directly by the employee. 
 
For both the NES and LFS data, “initial” and “lagged” effects of the introduction of 
the minimum wage are estimated. The initial effects are defined over time periods 
where the minimum wage is introduced at some point between t and t+1. The lagged 
effects are defined over time periods where the minimum wage is introduced between 
t-1 and t. The argument for estimating these lagged effects is that if employers are 
constrained in their labour demand responses to the introduction of the minimum 
wage, either through contractual obligations or the slower implementation of the 
minimum wage rates, labour demand responses may not be observed immediately. 
Instead a lagged effect of the minimum wage introduction on the change in working 
hours might be expected 
 
For the NES, the initial effect is defined in terms of the difference in working hours 
between April 1998 (t), when no minimum wage was in place, and April 1999 (t+1), 
when the minimum wage was in place, and compares this with differences entirely 
pre-NMW.  NES lagged effects compare differences over April 1999 (t) to April 2000 
(t+1) with the same pre-NMW periods.  
 
For the LFS data the initial effect is defined for working hour differences between t 
and t+1 that lie within the March 1998 to May 2000 timeframe and compares the 
differences with the pre-NMW differences. In comparison the LFS lagged effects 
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compare the differences defined over April 1999 (so the minimum wage is in place at 
time t) to September 2000 with the same pre-NMW periods.  For both the LFS and 
NES data sets the t+1 time periods used in the lagged effects are prior to the first adult 
uprating of the minimum wage in October 2000. 
 
Two hours measures are analysed in both datasets: basic working hours and total paid 
working hours. Basic working hours are defined as the hours worked by employees as 
part of their standard employment contract before overtime.  Total paid working hours 
are the sum of the basic hours and paid overtime hours. (Unpaid overtime hours are 
excluded.)  The distinction between the two is potentially important since some 
employees may be able to choose to adjust overtime hours, but this is unlikely to be 
the case for basic hours. 
 
For the NES the gross hourly wage variable is a “basic hourly wage rate”.  It is 
defined as gross weekly earnings excluding overtime, divided by normal basic hours.  
It is restricted to employees whose pay for the survey period was not affected by 
absence. For the LFS the gross hourly wage variable is an “average hourly wage rate”.  
It is constructed as gross pay in the most recent pay period, converted to a weekly 
basis and then divided by usual hours per week.3 For both data sets the gross hourly 
wage rate is deflated to April 1999 using the all-items RPI. 
 
The difference-in-differences approach based on position in the wage distribution 
used in this paper requires that those in the directly affected group, below the 
minimum wage, experience larger wage growth than those in the comparison group, 
above the minimum, and that this difference shows up significantly in the wage 
measure used in the construction of these groups for the analysis of the effect on 
hours. That this is indeed the case is demonstrated by Stewart (2004a) for both the 
NES and LFS datasets used here. 
 
 
                                                          
3 From the spring quarter of 1999 a new question was added to the LFS questionnaire that asked 
directly about the hourly rate that respondents are paid (but only for those who are hourly paid).  The 
timing of the introduction of this additional question prevents it being used to investigate the impact of 
the introduction of minimum wage when a comparison with pre-minimum periods is involved. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Evidence on the fundamental identifying assumption 
 
The fundamental identifying assumption underlying the difference-in-differences 
approach is that in the absence of a minimum wage the time paths of hours growth 
would be the same for each of the wage groups. i.e. that there are no significant 
interactions in the pre-minimum wage period between the wage group effects and the 
time effects.  To formally examine whether this assumption holds for the data used in 
this paper we follow the procedure in Stewart (2004a) by restricting attention to the 
pre-minimum wage period and testing the significance of interactions between the 
wage group and time dummies for the period when no minimum wage was in place. 
 
For the pre-minimum wage period in the LFS data the joint test statistic p-values with 
and without control variables for total paid hours were 0.25 and 0.39 for the male 
sample and 0.44 and 0.59 for the female sample. In each case therefore the tests 
provide evidence supporting the underlying assumption of no interactions. Test 
statistic p-values for basic hours only are even larger and hence provide even stronger 
evidence in favour of the underlying assumption of no interactions in the absence of 
the minimum wage. 
 
For the NES data the picture is more complex. For men, when all four waves when 
there was no minimum (1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98) are included in the 
pre-period the test statistics reject the hypothesis of no significant interactions for both 
total and basic working hours. The p-values based on total (basic) paid hours were 
0.002 (0.05) both with and without controls.  The significant interaction driving this in 
both cases is that for the first period, 1994-95. The growth pattern is clearly different 
for this first year. If this time period is excluded from the pre-minimum wage period, 
the hypothesis of no significant interactions is strongly supported. As a result, 
throughout the paper the NES results presented for men exclude 1994-95 from the 
pre-minimum wage period for men and use only data for 1995-98. 
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For women the NES data are more supportive of the assumption. For total paid hours, 
test statistic p-values of 0.41 (0.21) without (with) controls provide strong evidence 
supporting the underlying assumption. For basic paid hours there is some evidence of 
a marginally significant interaction for 1997-98. However the effect is small and to 
allow equivalent comparisons between total and basic paid hours in the reported 
estimates for women the 1997-98 data were not excluded from the pre-minimum 
wage period. The baseline estimates presented below change little if this wave is 
excluded. 
 
5.2 Graphical examination  of hours changes 
 
Before presenting the estimated effects on hours of work using the difference-in-
differences estimator and extensions thereof, we present here a simple graphical 
examination of the hours changes by wage group in the NES and LFS datasets.  
Figure 1 shows the average change in total paid hours (basic plus paid overtime) 
between t and t+1 for male employees in the NES plotted against the hourly wage at 
time t, using cells of width 10p.  Figure 2 shows the equivalent plot for women.  Both 
figures show evidence of a negative lagged effect (and a more limited initial effect) 
for those initially below £3.60 per hour (in real terms adjusted to April 1999) relative 
both to the pre-minimum period and to those above £3.60.  The plots look very similar 
for changes in basic hours only. 
 
This graphical examination can also be used as an informal investigation of the likely 
sensitivity of the difference-in-differences estimates to the choice of wage range for 
the control group (see Dickens and Draca, 2005) and, to a more limited degree, the 
relative appropriateness of alternative specifications for the treatment group (binary 
indicator versus wage gap).  The graphs above £3.60 do not suggest that defining 
c = 0.10 (i.e. taking the control group to be the range £3.60 – £3.96) would be 
unrepresentative or that the difference-in-differences estimates would be expected to 
be unduly sensitive to adjustments to this definition.  (Looking at estimates based on 
alternative definitions of c below supports this.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
The graphs below £3.60 give some evidence that a wage gap representation might be 
more appropriate than a binary indicator (i.e. that hours changes are larger for lower 
initial wage rates).  However there is a worry that low values of the wage may be 
distorted by measurement error which may unduly affect the wage gap estimates. 
 
Since the sample sizes in the LFS datasets are much smaller than in the NES, the 
corresponding LFS plots would be based on very small cell sizes.  We therefore use a 
moving 20p window for the LFS plots presented in Figures 3 and 4.  For men there is 
some evidence of negative initial and lagged effects for those initially below £3.60, 
relative both to the pre-minimum period and to those above £3.60, but there is also 
more fluctuation in the plots for both of these comparators.  For women there is little 
evidence of any differences – either between the three plots or comparing above and 
below £3.60.  (Again the plots look very similar for changes in basic hours only.) 
 
5.3 Difference-in-differences estimates 
 
Difference-in-differences estimates of initial and lagged effects, for the NES for adult 
male and female employees are given in Table 1.4  For men, the raw difference-in-
differences estimate of the initial effect is insignificant for both the change in total 
paid hours and the change in basic hours. In comparison the lagged effect, capturing 
the impact after the initial period, is negative and significant for both hours measures. 
 
The estimates with control variables included imply a lagged effect of a reduction in 
total paid hours of about 1.5 hours per week as a result of the introduction of the 
minimum wage and a total effect (initial plus lagged) of about 1.2 hours.  Almost all 
of this effect comes through a reduction in basic hours.  There is a negligible effect on 
paid overtime hours. 
 
                                                          
4 For the NES the control vector includes year dummies, regional dummies, age (and square), hourly 
earnings (linear, square and cube) and part-time dummy. For the LFS it includes year and month 
dummies, regional dummies, hourly earnings (linear, square and cube), dummies for part-time, 
married, ethnic group, public sector, permanent, health and highest educational qualifications, labour 
market experience (linear, square and cube), length of tenure with current employer (and square) and 
educational leaving age. The real wage cubic is included in each control vector to try and deal with the 
potential correlation between wages and hours in the absence of the minimum wage. 
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When the alternative definition of the wage groups employing also the information on 
the wage at (t+1) is used, the initial effects remain insignificantly different from zero.  
The lagged effects strengthen slightly and imply a reduction in total paid hours of 
about 1.9 hours per week, all through a reduction in basic hours, and a total effect 
(initial + lagged) of about 1.7 hours. 
 
The construction of the comparison group is potentially crucial to the difference-in-
differences estimator.  Estimates are also presented in Table 1 for a comparison group 
constructed to include those up to 15% above the April 1999 minimum.  This reduces 
the magnitude and significance of the lagged effect.  The magnitude of the combined 
effect (initial + lagged) however changes relatively little. The sensitivity of the 
estimates to the choice of real wage deflator is shown. If this is changed from the 
Office for National Statistics all-items RPI to the RPI excluding mortgage payments, 
the results are fairly robust, although indicating a slight fall in overall magnitude and 
significance for the lagged effects. 
 
The lower panel of Table 1 gives the corresponding estimates for women.  All are 
negative.  For the initial effects the estimates for total paid hours are all significantly 
negative, while those for basic hours are all insignificant with the first definition of 
the wage groups, but significant when the definition utilizing also the information on 
the wage at (t+1) is used.  The lagged effects are negative and significant for both 
total and basic hours and for both wage group definitions. For women the overall 
(initial + lagged) effect on total paid hours is slightly larger than that for men at about 
2.1 hours using the first wage group definition and about 2.9 using the second 
definition.  The female NES estimates appear relatively robust to the inclusion of the 
control vector, widening of the comparison group and an alternative real wage 
deflator.5
 
                                                          
5 The evidence for women in Table 1, of a reduction in hours after the introduction of the NMW, is in 
contrast to the findings of Connolly and Gregory (2002) [CG], also based on NES data. (Their results 
are only for basic hours and they do not use the wage at t+1 information.) Important differences 
between the specifications are, first, that we restrict the sample to employees who remained with the 
same employer between t and t+1 while CG do not and, second, that our dependent variable is the 
change in working hours between t and t+1, while CG use the level of working hours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
The results based on the LFS data are given in Table 2.  The estimated initial effect is 
insignificant for both total and basic hours and for both men and women, and this 
finding is robust to the various modifications of specification presented.  The lagged 
effect estimates for total paid hours are insignificant for both men and women, as are 
those on basic hours for women.  The lagged effect on basic hours for men, however, 
is significantly negative and relatively large in magnitude, indicating a reduction in 
basic hours for the affected group relative to the comparison group, after the 
minimum wage introduction, of 2.9 hours with the first definition and 3.9 with the 
second.  The significance of this estimate is similar to that of the estimates in Table 1 
for men on the NES, although the magnitude of the LFS estimate is slightly larger.  
The difference between the estimates for basic and total hours suggests that changes 
in the former may have been partially offset by changes in overtime hours in this case. 
 
As mentioned above the LFS suffers from a potential problem of additional 
measurement error caused by proxy responses. If observations with a proxy response 
at either t or t+1 are excluded from the sample, which obviously affects cell sizes, the 
findings are not greatly affected.  For men both lagged effects become more negative, 
but the standard errors also rise markedly. 
 
The sensitivity of the estimates to the construction of the hourly wage rate used to 
construct the wage groups is also examined in Table 2.  If instead of dividing usual 
weekly pay by usual weekly hours to construct the average hourly wage, the actual 
hours of work for a specified week (not necessarily matching the pay period) are used, 
all four effects for women and both initial effects and the lagged effect on total paid 
hours for men remain insignificant.  However now the lagged effect on basic hours for 
men also becomes insignificant and the magnitude is much reduced. Of all the 
sensitivity issues investigated for the LFS this is the one with the greatest impact on 
the estimates. 
 
5.4 Alternative estimators using “wage gap” and spline constructions 
 
The alternative “wage gap” estimator takes account of the size of the “gap” between 
the initial wage and the incoming minimum, i.e. the increase needed to comply. These 
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estimates are presented in the “wage gap: dummies above” rows of Table 3.  The rows 
below that additionally model the range of the wage distribution above the minimum 
with linear spline terms as well as that below the minimum.  These pairs of rows 
provide results that are similar to each other, particularly when they are significant. 
Comparisons with the original NES “binary indicator” estimates show the “wage gap” 
specification to increase the significance of the estimates for both the initial and 
lagged effects for men, but only for the initial effects for women. For the LFS all 
“wage gap” and spline estimates were found to be insignificant. This included the 
previously significant lagged impact on basic hours for men. 
 
To compare the magnitudes of the “binary indicator” and “wage gap” (and spline) 
estimates it is most informative to evaluate the “wage gap” impact at the average 
distance of the wage at time period t from the minimum wage rate at t+1. For men in 
the NES the average lagged impact of the minimum wage is estimated at 
approximately -1.7 for total paid hours (the product of the average wage gap for wage 
group 1 (£0.54) and the coefficient estimate (-3.08)) and -1.5 for basic hours.  For 
women in the NES the initial effect was estimated as -0.7 for total paid hours and -0.6 
for basic hours. In both these cases the magnitude of the average effect based on the 
“wage gap” specification was similar to the original “binary treatment” estimate. In 
contrast to this, the male initial “wage gap” effects are oppositely signed to the 
original effects, although only of marginal significance, and the female lagged 
average “wage gap” estimates are less than half the “binary treatment” estimated 
effects.6  Although the “wage gap” and spline estimators have certain advantages, it 
should be noted, as stated in Section 3, that they are adversely affected by unduly low 
values of the wage variable and hence more vulnerable to measurement error in the 
wage than the “binary indicator” estimator. 
 
5.5  Further robustness checks 
 
As with all survey data, hours variables are likely to suffer from a degree of 
measurement error. How this potential measurement error affects the estimates here 
                                                          
6 The average value of the “wage gap” variable for the NES initial (lagged) estimates was £0.62 (£0.54) 
for male employees and £0.45 (£0.42) for female employees. 
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depends on the nature of the measurement error, for example whether it satisfies the 
assumptions of the classical model or not. Unfortunately there are no formal 
validation studies, for example comparing the responses of employees with those of 
their employers, for the hours variables on either the NES or the LFS.  Evidence from 
the US (Duncan and Hill (1985), Mellow and Sider (1983), Bound et al (2001)) may 
provide some limited pointers.  This suggests that employees tend to over-report hours 
of work compared with employers.  However there is also evidence that professional 
and managerial workers and more educated workers are more prone to this 
over-reporting, suggesting that it may be less of a problem for the low-paid workers 
who are central to the analysis in the current paper. 
 
A potential concern with regard to this paper is that the estimated effects may be 
exaggerated because of some large changes in working hours, which might in some 
cases be due in part to measurement error.  The approach adopted is to examine the 
robustness of the results to excluding various groups who might be thought to have a 
higher probability of measurement error in hours. Tables 4 presents NES difference-
in-differences estimates for samples where observations viewed as having a higher 
potential for measurement error are either excluded or have their hours moderated.  
These exclusions or truncations of the distribution are based on either the changes in 
hours between t and t+1 or the underlying levels at t and t+1. It should be noted that 
these modifications involve an endogenous selection or censoring. They should not 
therefore be viewed as alternative estimates on an equal footing with the original 
estimates, but rather are presented to give an impression of the robustness of the 
unmodified estimates. 
 
In sections (a) of Table 4 estimates are presented for samples which exclude those 
with changes in hours between t and t+1 first in excess of 30 and then in excess of 20.  
In the next block those with hours changes outside these limits have their values 
modified to this limit.  The next two blocks use similar modifications, but on the 
levels of hours. The results appear relatively robust to all these modifications. Similar 
robustness was also found for the estimates that use the information on the wage at 
time t+1 in the construction of the wage groups and for the estimates based on the 
LFS data.   
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The fifth block of Table 4 excludes those who work paid overtime at either t or t+1. 
The reasons for looking at this last modification are two-fold. The first relates to the 
issue of measurement error. One might expect those who work (paid) overtime to 
show more variation in their hours from week to week and might expect this to 
increase the probability of measurement error in reported hours. A second reason 
concerns the interpretation of the estimated effects as demand responses. If the effects 
presented were supply responses, since one might expect employees who work (paid) 
overtime to have more scope to adjust their hours, this would lead one to expect the 
estimates to decline (in absolute value) when those working paid overtime are 
excluded. This does not happen. For women the total of initial and lagged effects 
increases very slightly from an estimated reduction of 1.7 hours to 1.8 hours. For men 
it doubles from an estimated reduction of 1.5 hours to one of 3.1 hours. Thus the 
original result is not being driven by the effect for those who work overtime. This 
mitigates against a supply interpretation. In addition the exclusion of a group more 
likely to be prone to measurement error, as before, does not reduce the effect. 
 
Overall it would appear that the estimates presented in this paper, and the implied 
impact of the introduction of the minimum wage on the working hours of low-wage 
employees, are relatively robust to excluding observations that are potentially more 
likely to suffer from measurement error. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the impact of the introduction of the minimum wage on the 
working hours of low-wage workers.  The results presented broadly indicate a 
negative effect on hours, although the evidence is not unanimous and there is some 
variation both in terms of the magnitude and significance of the estimated effects.  
The majority of the effect on total paid hours is found to be through the effect on basic 
hours.  Typically the effects on these two are very similar and the effect on paid 
overtime hours is minimal and insignificant. 
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Lagged effects are found to dominate the initial effects.  On the basis of the NES, the 
lagged effect on basic hours is estimated to be a reduction of between 1 and 2 hours 
per week.  The lagged effect on total paid hours is very similar.  The initial effect on 
basic hours is smaller (and in most cases insignificant).  The LFS results are typically 
weaker than the corresponding NES ones in terms of significance. 
 
The picture is perhaps clearest on the estimates of the total effect (i.e. initial + lagged 
effects).  The estimates are generally found to be negative for both basic and total 
hours, and for both men and women.  The NES total effect estimates indicate a 
reduction of between 1 and 2 hours per week in basic hours for both men and women, 
and similar for total paid hours. These estimates are fairly robust to the estimator and 
specification used. The LFS estimated total effects on basic hours are greater for men 
and lower for women, but in both cases with much reduced precision.  The implied 
total effect on paid overtime hours in all cases is typically close to zero. Although the 
results are not found to be completely robust between the two datasets, in broad terms 
the evidence presented in this paper suggests strongly that the introduction of the 
minimum wage led to a reduction in the paid working hours of both male and female 
low-wage workers. 
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Figure 1: Change in total hours for male employees (NES)
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Figure 2: Change in total hours for female employees (NES)
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Figure 3: Change in total hours for male employees (LFS)
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Figure 4: Change in total hours for female employees (LFS)
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Table 1 
Effect of minimum wage introduction on hours: difference-in-differences estimates: NES data 
 
 Total paid hours Basic paid hours Total paid hours Basic paid hours 
   
 Initial effect Lagged effect 
Males     
Definition without w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences 0.331 (0.54) 0.160 (0.31) -1.843 (2.29) -1.920 (2.60)
With control vector 0.325 (0.54) 0.132 (0.26) -1.522 (1.93) -1.604 (2.22)
Comparison group to MW + 15% 0.199 (0.38) 0.038 (0.09) -1.355 (1.82) -1.274 (1.84)
Alternative real wage deflator 0.553 (0.90) 0.295 (0.57) -1.480 (1.88) -1.568 (2.17)
  
Definition with w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences 0.344 (0.49) 0.141 (0.23) -2.272 (2.47) -2.271 (2.65)
With control vector 0.256 (0.37) 0.034 (0.06) -1.927 (2.14) -1.928 (2.31)
Comparison group to MW + 15% 0.028 (0.04) -0.163 (0.30) -1.781 (2.08) -1.650 (2.04)
Alternative real wage deflator 0.513 (0.73) 0.211 (0.35) -1.885 (2.10) -1.892 (2.26)
  
Females  
Definition without w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences -0.606 (2.13) -0.299 (1.23) -1.495 (3.53) -1.370 (3.43)
With control vector -0.627 (2.25) -0.316 (1.34) -1.499 (3.66) -1.370 (3.56)
Comparison group MW plus 15% -0.570 (2.21) -0.214 (0.96) -1.293 (3.30) -1.085 (2.93)
Alternative real wage deflator -0.622 (2.16) -0.407 (1.67) -1.488 (3.63) -1.363 (3.55)
  
Definition with w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences -1.047 (3.30) -0.668 (2.42) -1.896 (3.87) -1.787 (3.83)
With control vector -1.077 (3.48) -0.695 (2.60) -1.866 (3.95) -1.751 (3.91)
Comparison group to MW + 15% -1.000 (3.46) -0.562 (2.22) -1.659 (3.64) -1.467 (3.37)
Alternative real wage deflator -1.084 (3.37) -0.791 (2.85) -1.855 (3.93) -1.745 (3.90)
  
 
Notes: 
1. “Initial effect” refers to the period with (t, t+1) = (April 1998, April 1999). “Lagged effect” refers 
to the period with (t, t+1) = (April 1999, April 2000). 
2. “Prior to NMW introduction” refers to the pooled period with t = April 1995-96, 1996-97 and 
1997-98 for men. That for women also includes April 1994-95. 
3. Sample includes adult (22-64) employees with the same employer at t+1 as at t. 
4. Sample sizes for men: 1st row: 191,228 for initial effect, 190,625 for lagged effect; other rows: 
190,529 for initial effect, 189,936 for lagged effect. Sample sizes for women: 1st row: 187,792 for 
initial effect, 187,565 for lagged effect; other rows: 187,168 for initial effect, 186,939 for lagged 
effect 
5. Dependent variable is the change in paid working hours (either total or basic).  
6. Robust absolute t-ratios are in the parentheses.  
7. Control vector (defined at time t) includes year dummies, regional dummies, age (and square), 
hourly earnings (linear, square and cube) and part-time dummy. 
8. The alternative real wage deflator is the all-items RPI excluding mortgage repayments (CHMK), 
which replaces the baseline deflator which is the all-items RPI (CHAW). 
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Table 2 
Effect of minimum wage introduction on hours: difference-in-differences estimates: LFS data 
 
 Total paid hours Basic paid hours Total paid hours Basic paid hours 
 Initial effect Lagged effect 
Males  
Definition without w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences -0.966 (0.81) -1.078 (1.13) -0.686 (0.46) -2.545 (2.22)
With control vector -0.741 (0.62) -0.891 (0.93) -0.859 (0.56) -2.867 (2.44)
Comparison group NMW plus 15% -0.840 (0.82) -0.870 (1.00) -0.887 (0.68) -2.299 (1.99)
Alternative real wage deflator -0.691 (0.58) -0.843 (0.87) -0.973 (0.64) -2.989 (2.53)
Proxy responses (t or t+1) excluded 0.131 (0.07) -1.280 (0.92) -2.771 (1.05) -3.630 (1.95)
Actual hours in wage construction 0.152 (0.13) 0.449 (0.43) 0.266 (0.19) -1.135 (0.98)
Definition with w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences -1.434 (1.09) -1.277 (1.22) -1.662 (0.98) -3.638 (2.66)
With control vector -0.956 (0.72) -0.867 (0.83) -1.698 (0.98) -3.899 (2.78)
Comparison group NMW plus 15% -1.162 (1.04) -0.951 (1.02) -1.923 (1.28) -3.460 (2.49)
Alternative real wage deflator -0.832 (0.63) -0.775 (0.73) -1.812 (1.05) -4.020 (2.86)
Proxy responses (t or t+1) excluded -0.028 (0.01) -1.345 (0.88) -3.903 (1.26) -4.438 (1.90)
Actual hours in wage construction 0.033 (0.02) 0.383 (0.32) 0.156 (0.09) -1.570 (1.14)
  
Females  
Definition without w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences 0.112 (0.26) 0.227 (0.58) -0.385 (0.70) -0.384 (0.78)
With control vector 0.028 (0.06) 0.244 (0.63) -0.416 (0.77) -0.383 (0.79)
Comparison group NMW plus 15% -0.149 (0.39) -0.007 (0.02) -0.661 (1.34) -0.786 (1.77)
Alternative real wage deflator -0.079 (0.18) 0.054 (0.14) -0.360 (0.66) -0.381 (0.78)
Proxy responses (t or t+1) excluded -0.236 (0.47) -0.114 (0.25) -0.202 (0.33) -0.102 (0.18)
Actual hours in wage construction -0.179 (0.39) 0.015 (0.04) -0.960 (1.59) -0.843 (1.51)
Definition with w(t+1) information  
Raw difference-in-differences -0.238 (0.49) 0.149 (0.34) -1.101 (1.71) -0.693 (1.20)
With control vector -0.279 (0.58) 0.192 (0.44) -1.088 (1.72) -0.627 (1.10)
Comparison group NMW plus 15% -0.397 (0.92) -0.031 (0.08) -1.298 (2.25) -0.931 (1.77)
Alternative real wage deflator -0.319 (0.66) 0.052 (0.12) -1.032 (1.62) -0.625 (1.09)
Proxy responses (t or t+1) excluded -0.547 (0.97) -0.163 (0.31) -1.164 (1.62) -0.529 (0.77)
Actual hours in wage construction -0.773 (1.35) -0.538 (1.05) -1.084 (1.37) -0.746 (1.02)
Notes: 
1. “Initial effect” refers to the 2 period panels where t and t+1 lie between March 1998 and May 2000. 
2. “ Lagged effect” refers to the 2 period panels where t and t+1 lie between April 1999 and September 2000. 
3. Pre-minimum period is the pooled 2 period panels where t and t+1 lie between March 1997 and March 1999. 
4. Sample includes adult (22-64) male employees with the same employer at t+1 as at t. 
5. Sample sizes for 1st row: for men: 21,483 for initial effect, 15,928 for lagged effect: for women: 21,575 for initial effect, 
16,150 for lagged effect 
6. Dependent variable is the change in paid working hours (either total or basic).  
7. Robust absolute t-ratios are in the parentheses.  
8. Control vector (defined at time t) includes year and month dummies, regional dummies, hourly earnings (linear, square and 
cube), dummies for part-time, married, ethnic group, public sector, permanent, health and highest educational qualifications, 
labour market experience (linear, square and cube), length of tenure with current employer (and square) and educational 
leaving age. 
9. The alternative real wage deflator denotes the ONS data series of all-items RPI excluding mortgage repayments (CHMK) 
rather than the baseline real wage deflator using the ONS data series of all-items RPI (CHAW). 
10. The average hourly wage construction uses actual paid hours in the denominator rather than usual paid hours. Please note that 
fewer observations are available when actual hours are used to construct the wage variable, predominantly due to those away 
from their jobs (who are asked for their usual hours but not their actual hours). 
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Table 3 
 
“Wage gap” estimates of the effect of the minimum wage introduction on hours: 
NES and LFS 
 
 Total paid 
hours 
Basic paid 
hours 
Total paid 
hours 
Basic paid 
hours 
 Initial effect Lagged effect 
NES: men     
Difference-in-differences 0.325 (0.54) 0.132 (0.26) -1.522 (1.93) -1.604 (2.22) 
Wage gap: dummies above -0.990 (1.55) -0.815 (1.41) -3.079 (2.85) -2.820 (2.66) 
Spline, three segments -1.206 (1.70) -0.881 (1.37) -3.216 (2.85) -2.817 (2.55) 
     
NES: women     
Difference-in-differences -0.627 (2.25) -0.316 (1.34) -1.499 (3.66) -1.370 (3.56) 
Wage gap: dummies above -1.519 (3.45) -1.239 (2.99) -1.668 (1.85) -1.411 (1.57) 
Spline, three segments -1.344 (2.82) -1.243 (2.76) -1.760 (1.88) -1.434 (1.54) 
     
LFS: men     
Difference-in-differences -0.741 (0.62) -0.891 (0.93) -0.859 (0.56) -2.867 (2.44) 
Wage gap: dummies above 0.172 (0.25) 0.121 (0.19) -0.102 (0.13) -0.255 (0.38) 
Spline, three segments 0.244 (0.32) 0.182 (0.26) 0.036 (0.05) 0.178 (0.25) 
     
LFS: women     
Difference-in-differences 0.028 (0.06) 0.244 (0.63) -0.416 (0.77) -0.383 (0.79) 
Wage gap: dummies above -0.564 (1.26) -0.076 (0.17) -1.010 (1.21) -1.083 (1.30) 
Spline, three segments -0.684 (1.41) -0.145 (0.31) -0.893 (1.00) -1.032 (1.15) 
     
 
Notes: 
1.  Group definitions without w(t+1) information. 
2.  See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 4  
Difference-in-differences estimates with restrictions on hour changes or levels: NES 
 
 Total paid hours Basic paid hours Total paid hours Basic paid hours 
 Initial effect Lagged effect 
Men     
Unadjusted estimates 0.325 (0.54) 0.132 (0.26) -1.522 (1.93) -1.604 (2.22) 
(a) Restrict sample to changes lying within:   
          Abs(Δht) ≤ 30  0.036 (0.07) -0.300 (0.70) -1.588 (2.40) -1.551 (2.55) 
          Abs(Δht) ≤ 20  -0.335 (0.82) -0.412 (1.19) -1.136 (2.17) -0.907 (1.86) 
(b) Modify those outside limit to limit:   
          -30 ≤ Δht ≤ 30 0.123 (0.22) -0.018 (0.04) -1.743 (2.39) -1.707 (2.53) 
          -20 ≤ Δht ≤ 20 0.005 (0.01) -0.162 (0.39) -1.561 (2.50) -1.492 (2.57) 
(c) Restrict sample to total hours levels at time t and t+1 within:  
          10  –  70 -0.221 (0.44) -0.470 (1.11) -1.614 (2.44) -1.388 (2.30) 
          10  –  60 -0.215 (0.44) -0.444 (1.07) -1.687 (2.76) -1.692 (2.91) 
          10  –  50 -0.305 (0.67) -0.252 (0.60) -1.348 (2.35) -1.392 (2.47) 
(d) Modify those outside limit on level at t or t+1 to limit (before construct changes): 
          10 and 70 -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -1.897 (2.65) -1.713 (2.55) 
          10 and 60 -0.020 (0.04) -0.028 (0.06) -1.917 (2.86) -1.826 (2.84) 
(e) Excluding those who work paid overtime    
          No paid overtime at t or t+1 -0.133 (0.20) -0.133 (0.20) -2.980 (3.68) -2.980 (3.68) 
  
Women  
Unadjusted estimates -0.627 (2.25) -0.316 (1.34) -1.499 (3.66) -1.370 (3.56) 
(a) Restrict sample to changes lying within:  
          Abs(Δht) ≤ 30  -0.697 (2.81) -0.459 (2.09) -1.393 (3.86) -1.309 (3.86) 
          Abs(Δht) ≤ 20  -0.593 (2.76) -0.414 (2.19) -0.987 (3.30) -1.005 (3.50) 
(b) Modify those outside limit to limit:  
          -30 ≤ Δht ≤ 30 -0.659 (2.49) -0.378 (1.65) -1.500 (3.86) -1.385 (3.79) 
          -20 ≤ Δht ≤ 20 -0.663 (2.72) -0.398 (1.87) -1.373 (3.95) -1.302 (3.94) 
(c) Restrict sample to total hours levels at time t and t+1 within: 
          10  –  70 -0.736 (2.70) -0.444 (1.92) -1.306 (3.31) -1.192 (3.23) 
          10  –  60 -0.677 (2.54) -0.478 (2.08) -1.305 (3.42) -1.194 (3.36) 
          10  –  50 -0.751 (2.95) -0.561 (2.48) -1.353 (3.73) -1.240 (3.57) 
(d) Modify those outside limit on level at t or t+1 to limit (before construct changes): 
          10 and 70 -0.586 (2.21) -0.316 (1.41) -1.484 (3.80) -1.379 (3.76) 
          10 and 60 -0.598 (2.30) -0.335 (1.51) -1.517 (3.93) -1.408 (3.88) 
(e) Excluding those who work paid overtime    
          No paid overtime at t or t+1 -0.233 (0.82) -0.233 (0.82) -1.543 (3.16) -1.543 (3.16) 
  
 
Notes:   
1.  Group definitions without w(t+1) information. 
2.  See also notes to Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
